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When Douglas Coupland (1991) published Generation X in 1991. South Africa 
was undergoing massive political and social transformations. The preceding 
years had been marked by political turmoil, the danger of imminent civil war 
and violent clashes between the apartheid state‟s security forces and angry 
protesters against the apartheid regime. The government‟s racist policies were 
ostracised by the international community – boycotts and sanctions were 
throttling an economy already at the brink of collapse due to the monstrous costs 
of an institutionally divided society and the lack of a sizeable affluent and well-
educated middle-class. In 1989 Nelson Mandela was released from prison, and 
at the time of Coupland‟s writing negotiations were in full motion in preparation 
for the country‟s adoption of a new constitution and its first democratic elections 
in 1994. Thus the characteristics of Coupland‟s (anti-)heroes, their aimlessness, 
whininess, “slackness” and very fictionality stand in stark contrast not only to 
the US black and white youth protesters of the 1960s, but also to the ambitions, 
anger, harshness and the very reality of most young South Africans during the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. The one thing that South Africans did not suffer 
from at the time was “Historical Underdosing”
1
: the Cafe Latte in the hand of a 
slacker lost in a suburban mall replaced by the rock in the hand of a young angry 
protester on the streets of Soweto as the gaze shifts across the Atlantic. 
 
Thus, on first sight, the search for South Africa‟s Generation X appears rather 
futile and it is not surprising that the term itself has never found the same 
foothold in the South African public consciousness as in Western societies. 
Although it is frequently used in market research and related fields as a 
demographic category, its usage in scholarly articles is very rare, ambiguous and 
commonly in connection with „Y Culture‟
2
 – the emergence of a hedonistic and 
                                                 
1 Historical Underdosing: To live in a period of time when nothing seems to happen. Major 
symptoms include addiction to newspapers, magazines, and TV news broadcasts (Coupland 
1991: 7). 
2 Two of the very few direct references to Generation X in South Africa actually portray it 
as Y Culture‟s parent generation: 
 Y culture, increasingly also known as „loxion kulcha‟ („loxion‟ being a rescripting of the 
word „location‟), has emerged since 1996 from Johannesburg‟s suburbs, in particular 
Rosebank, and is crafted by urban black youth, but cross-over in its appeal, occupying the 
borderlands of the local and the global. „Y‟ is a living letter, the livewire sign of the times in 
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apolitical generation of South African urban youth who experienced their 
formative years during the transitional years of South Africa‟s young democracy 
during the 1990s. 
 
In addition to South Africa‟s historical peculiarity, the ambiguity within 
Generation X itself, seen in its original North American context, does not make 
the search for its South African equivalent easier; although Generation X is 
commonly associated with the disillusion, aimlessness and cynicism of the post-
baby boomers, there is also the interpretation by the marketing experts who tried 
to get a grip on this generation of supposed slackers by rendering their cynicism 
as smartness, their lack of values as flexibility, their lack of commitment as 
independence. Yes, America‟s twenty-somethings of the 1990s had lost their 
parents‟ belief in the grand narrative of progress and self-development, the 
marketing experts maintained, and they were immune to the selling of washing 
powder and cool drinks as the keys to happiness and success, but they still 
wanted to have a good time and a comfortable life, and they were even prepared 
to work hard for it (as long as it was in Silicon Valley or a trendy advertising 
agency), not because it was the right thing to do, as for their parent generation, 
but because if nothing else matters, you might just have fun while at it: 
Burdened by college loans and facing a shifting job market, Gen X 
yearns for affluence. In that, it takes after its grandparents more than 
its parents. A generation ago, small was beautiful and materialism had 
fallen out of fashion. Only 31% of twentysomethings in 1973 agreed 
that money is “a very important personal value.” Today 64% of Xers 
and matures say, “Material things, like what I drive and the house I 
live in, are really important to me.” Only half of boomers feel that 
way. Fewer twentysomethings seek “a simpler life,” and, strikingly, a 
third of them agree that “the only meaningful measure of success is 
money.” (Hornblower 1997) 
 
Perhaps it is just too forced an attempt to find Generation X in South Africa, 
seeing that its US American origins differ so significantly from the South 
                                                                                                                                                        
Johannesburg, now widely known by young hip South Africans as „Jozi‟. It stands for Youth, 
but also for „Why? It inscribes itself against, kicks loose from, X (the name given to the 
generation who fought in the anti-apartheid struggle and subsequently had difficulty finding a 
place in society). (Nuttall 2003: 235) 
 And: 
 Sometimes known as the Y Generation, contemporary black youth finds itself 
straddling cultural spaces. On the one hand, this generation is linked to its collective political 
and cultural past. On the other, it seeks, through conscious innovation, to establish an identity 
apart from (though not free of) Generation X, its parent culture, the politically active youth of 
the 1960s and 70s. This Y Generation and its ideals are evident in most contemporary popular 
culture media, mainly music, television and fashion. (2002) 
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African situation. After all, Generation X is the result of a combination of 
factors, most of which are particular to the demographics, political climate and 
economic development of the USA in the 1980s and 1990s. Nonetheless a 
comparison of this particular generation between the two countries proves to be 
fruitful as it reveals some of the flows underlying the processes of glocalization 
at a time of intensified cultural exchange and media frenzy. On first sight this 
exchange appears to be rather unidirectional; Bob Dylan being the icon for 
South African alternative rockers, house DJs and American gangster rappers the 
inspiration for kwaito stars (even if there has been a number of attempts of 
reversing the trend by showcasing kwaito in the USA). But by taking the stark 
contrast of the racial binary in the South African context and projecting it on 
America‟s Generation X one starts to see a pattern which otherwise would have 
remained hidden: Generation X‟s obsession with suburbia (not the ghetto), 
grunge (not hip hop), melancholy (not anger), Kurt Cobain (not Dr Dre) is more 
than anything evocative of www.stuffwhitepeoplelike.com (not 
www.thesource.com). This chapter aims to provide a detailed overview of the 
different ways in which South African youth adapted to the changing political 
and social climate during the transitional period and how they are related to 
certain themes in common descriptions of Generation X. At the same time usage 
of the term as an all-encompassing label for the multiplicity of lived experiences 
in a racially divided society will be avoided. By doing so the hidden ambiguities 
and silent assumptions concerning race and class within common scholarly 
treatments of Generation X become pronounced, opening the debate about the 




Young South Africans during the 1980s 
 
The South African contemporaries of Coupland‟s Generation X in the USA 
lived in entirely different circumstances. Whereas young Americans – especially 
suburban, white Americans – in the 1980s were largely apolitical, reacting 
against the 1960s radicalism of their parents‟ generation, young South Africans 
in the 1980s lived in the hyper-politicised environment of the final years of 
apartheid. Indeed, it was primarily young men and women who maintained this 
politicisation, often reacting against what they saw as the passivity and 
acquiescence of their parents. By the 1980s apartheid – the system of 
institutionalized racial discrimination and segregation – was under strain from a 
variety of sources. The growing and changing economy required more skilled 
labour than the privileged white minority could provide, so growing numbers of 
black South Africans were upwardly mobile into skilled blue-collar, white-
collar, and even professional and managerial occupations. There was a dramatic 
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expansion of secondary and even tertiary education among black South 
Africans, especially among the first large generation to have grown up in towns 
and cities. Black households with rising incomes nonetheless experienced poor 
living conditions because of severe restrictions on development in black 
townships. At the same time, rural poverty pushed many poorly-schooled young 
men and women into the towns, fuelling the growth of an underclass of largely 
unemployed youth. The combination of frustrated, upwardly-mobile skilled 
working and nascent middle classes and growing numbers of poor and 
unemployed young men entailed a volatile mix. 
 
In 1984 black townships around South Africa exploded in protest. Initial protests 
were often focused on specific municipal and educational grievances, but they 
soon developed into a “township revolt” against apartheid as a whole. The state 
responded with inadequate concessions and repression that escalated conflict. 
Even severe repression served only to contain the revolt. By the end of the 
1980s it was clear to the apartheid state that there was no alternative to a 
negotiated settlement with its principal opponent, the banned African National 
Congress (ANC). Young black people played central roles in the revolt. For 
some observers, the township youth were the heroes – the “young lions” (as the 
ANC called them) or “young warriors” (Marks 2001) – of the struggle for 
liberation, rendering townships “ungovernable” and undermining the apartheid 
state. For other observers, black and white, these same young men (and, less 
often, women) were villains, coercing and threatening ordinary people into 
supporting unpopular campaigns, including consumer and other boycotts, the 
imposition of order through „people‟s courts‟, violent attacks on alleged 
„collaborators‟ whose guilt had not been demonstrated, and the sexual abuse of 
young women. Sometimes being a villain was simply the other side of the coin 
of being a hero. Often, however, the villains and the heroes were different 
people. Some young participants in resistance had clear political ideals, or were 
motivated by specific educational or civic grievances. Others were attracted to 
protest and conflict by the slogans, songs, and a search for camaraderie, or even 
by the ambition to be a warrior-hero (which, for most young people in more 
ordinary times, remains a fantasy). There were some who were motivated by 
greed, and some who had prior histories of criminal or anti-social violence. The 
participants in „resistance‟ were highly diverse (Straker 1992; Seekings 1993; 
Marks 2001). 
 
The more politicised young people forged a distinctive subculture, defined in 
part by the embrace of non-racialism, at least as an ideal. Non-racialism 
entailed, in practice, a degree of elitism, and maintaining a distance from some 
of the more “corrupting” aspects of township life. In Durban, the ANC-aligned 
“matsatsatsa” preferred jazz music, kept their hair short and dressed smartly and 
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fashionably. They were attracted to activities, such as weight-lifting, that were 
associated with both “discipline” and the middle-class life outside of the 
townships (Dlamini 2005). In Soweto, also, being a “comrade” precluded 
drinking or drugs, and entailed stringent discipline. „The comrades developed 
their own sub-culture involving a certain asceticism, an avoidance of frivolous 
activities. Instead of going to shebeens and parties, the comrades would read, 
have political discussions and go to meetings‟ (Marks 2001: 59). At the time, it 
was widely assumed and sometimes asserted that active participation in political 
protest was the norm. „Certainly among the youth it was the majority who 
participated in the eruptions‟, wrote Straker (1992: 19); „the youngster who did 
not participate in these popular uprisings was the exception rather than the rule.‟ 
It was certainly the case that, in many parts of South Africa in the 1980s, 
childhood and adolescence were framed by political protest and violence (1986; 
Dawes & Donald 1994). But it is unlikely that actual participation extended 
beyond a minority of young black men, and even fewer young black women. 
Indeed, many young people strove to avoid political activity; especially in parts 
of the country (notably KwaZulu-Natal) where partisan rivalry between black 
political organizations meant that any display of partisanship exposed one to 
possibly fatal retribution. 
 
For many young black men and women, even in the 1980s and early 1990s, life 
revolved around home, school (despite disruptions), church and sport. Indeed, in 
townships around Durban, where rival black political organisations competed 
violently, soccer clubs were characterized by a „code of silence‟: players did not 
talk about themselves or their lives outside of soccer, because this might lead to 
political topics. Some churches went further still, and defined politics as an 
unchristian practice, forbidding their members from engaging in political 
activity (Dlamini 2005). 
 
The political situation changed rapidly in the early 1990s, following the 
unbanning of the ANC and release of its political leaders. Negotiations between 
the government and the ANC culminated in democratic elections in April 1994. 
Political leaders from all sides grew concerned about the so-called “lost 
generation” of “marginalized youth”, i.e. adolescents who had boycotted and 
failed to complete school, who had fought with the security forces in township 
streets, who had challenged the authority of parents and teachers, and who had 
used violence against other township residents in the name of „the struggle‟. The 
media fuelled a series of moral panics over the political, social and moral threat 
posed by this supposed generation, and both the apartheid government and 
ANC-aligned groups commissioned research on young people (Seekings 1995; 
Seekings 1996). These research programmes found that only a minority of 
young people could be considered marginalized and very few should be 
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considered as “lost”. Young South Africans were shown to be religious (more 
than two out of three young people attending church at least twice a month), 
active in church choirs, sports clubs and other associations, critical of crime and 
delinquency, and generally positive in their outlook. Young people described 
themselves most often as “ambitious” (Slabbert 1994; CASE 1993). At the same 




Disillusionment – Young Afrikaners in the late 
1980s 
 
Black South African youth were not the only ones who were protesting against 
the apartheid regime in the late 1980s. Young white South Africans were the 
beneficiaries of apartheid, and for the most part enjoyed lives of comfortable 
and safe prosperity, but in the 1980 not even they were insulated from the 
political conflict. Through the 1980s, young white men had to perform two full 
years of national service in the security forces, and thereafter had to serve for 
shorter periods. Many were exposed to conflict, both on (and over) the South 
African or South-West African (Namibian) borders (especially in northern 
Namibia and southern Angola), or in townships inside South Africa. Recent 
research has documented how unpopular national service was: „Many young 
men, straight out of school or university, were not staunchly patriotic and did 
not want to give two years of their lives to the military, mothers didn‟t want to 
lose sons, and South Africa‟s apartheid government was condemned 
internationally for fighting an unjust war‟ (Thompson 2006: viii: ). National 
service entailed routine and often brutal humiliation during training, followed by 
exposure to combat on the borders or to the stress of policing townships inside 
the country (Thompson 2006; Blake 2009). The overt refusal of an increasing 
number of white South Africans to risk their lives for a cause they did not 
believe in or even rejected was eventually channelled into the establishment of a 
concerted movement against the continuation of compulsive conscription, the 
End of Conscription Campaign (ECC), in 1983. From 1987 to 1988 166 men 
publicly declared their objection and refused to report for duty, prompting the 
banning of the organisation by the government in 1988. In order to fully 
comprehend the decision to object, one needs to understand it was not merely a 
political one; military service played a major role in white South Africans‟ 
images of citizenship and masculinity during apartheid; not to participate was 
thus seen as a failure to be a “real” South African man (Conway 2005). 
 
The growing disillusionment not only with apartheid politics, but also the very 
values and ideology on which they were founded, among at least some young 
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white South Africans is further illustrated and exemplified by the success of the 
so-called voëlvry movement. Although voëlvry (directly translated meaning 
“free as a bird” or actually, and more accurately, “fugitive” in Afrikaans) was 
almost exclusively produced by and directed at Afrikaners and therefore only 
affected a relatively small part of South African society. Yet its impact should 
not be underestimated at it signifies the transition (or break) from the 
conservative tradition of romanticism and naiveté in Afrikaner “volksmusiek” to 
a contemporary and progressive type of socially-conscious Afrikaner rock, and, 
on a broader level, meant nothing less than an exploration of the possibilities of 
a new Afrikaner identity beyond the narrow definitions and restrictions 
propagated by the apartheid government. In the light of this it surprises that one 
of the major influences for the movement came from the music of an “English” 
South African, James Phillips, who had been fronting a string of punk-
influenced underground bands in Johannesburg since the early 1980s. In 1985, 
bilingual Phillips brought out a protest album in Afrikaans under the pseudonym 
Bernoldus Niemand, with the anti-conscription song “Hou my vas Korporal”. 
The album made a lasting impression on alternative Afrikaans artists and 
musicians, such as writer and singer André du Toit (aka André Letoit aka Koos 
Kombuis) who travelled from Cape Town to Johannesburg in order to meet 
Phillips and see him play at his regular hang-out, the Jameson‟s. Letoit 
eventually joined Phillips on the independent Shifty label, which was known to 
sign almost exclusively “subversive” bands without any chance of getting 
airplay on the strictly censored radio stations of the state broadcaster SABC. 
Back in Cape Town, Letois befriended and started performing with the singer 
Ralph Rabie (aka Johannes Kerkorrel) who, rhetorically gifted and outspoken, 
would go on to become the movement‟s figurehead. In 1989, Koos Kombuis, 
Bernoldus Niemand (as Bernoldus Niemand en die Swart Gevaar together with 
his old band The Cherry-Faced Lurchers), Johannes Kerkorrel (as Johannes 
Kerkorrel en die Gereformeerde Blues Band) and a number of other alternative 
Afrikaans musicians went on the notorious voëlvry tour through South Africa 
which is today regarded as a watershed in the evolution of Afrikaner music and 
the defining moment of Alternative Afrikaans music. 
 
Although voëlvry was overtly political and represented and spoke to only a 
relatively small group of South Africans it deserves special attention as one can 
find significant parallels to North America‟s Generation X in the late 
1980s/early 1990s. Most importantly, both groups shared a distinct 
disillusionment with their provenance in society, in terms of their social origin 
(middle-class) and, consequently, space (suburbia) as well as the status symbols 
and rituals attached to them. So just as the main characters in Coupland‟s 
Generation X – three well-educated, wisecracking and confused twenty-
somethings – are trying, and failing, to escape the boredom and materialistic 
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meaninglessness of their previous lives by moving to a retirement village in the 
desert, the lyrics of Kerkorrel, Kombuis and their peers often contain very direct 
references to the superficial pretensions of suburbia. This point has been 
previously made by Andries Bezuidenhout (2007) in an unpublished seminar 
paper (one of the very few scholarly treatments of voëlvry), in which he cites 
various song texts alluding to suburbia. Commenting on excerpts from “Tronk” 
(Prison) and “Ry” (Ride), both by Kerkorrel, he writes that “[b]arking 
watchdogs are typical of South African suburbs. Kerkorrel sings about “brains” 
and “thoughts” that are locked in chains – the inability to break out of the 
constraints of the pseudo-traditional organisational complex of Afrikaner 
nationalism. In “Ry” [Ride], he sings about the need to escape from suburban 
life, and the snobbery and class- consciousness of middle-class life in the 
suburbs.” Another excerpt from Koos Kombuis‟ “Paranoia” provides a 
particular dark and cynical insight into how depressing the hypocrisy of 
suburbia must have felt for many Afrikaners at the time: 
Ek is „n doos 
van Bellville-Oos 
Jannie moer vir Sannie blou 
ma se kind ek voeter jou 
hou op met skrou 
bly stil ons kyk die 
Cosby Show 
I‟m a sleaze 
from Bellville East 
Jannie beats Sannie black and blue 
Mommy‟s child, I‟ll strangle you 
stop that crying 
shut up, we‟re watching the 
Cosby Show 
Voort voort in Parow-Noord 
Ben om die hoek is kwaad 
want sy ex-vrou lê weer op straat 
daar‟s geen teken van sy E-type 
sy‟s weg met alles tot 
die hosepipe 
en vergas haarself met 
die advokaat 
en vergas haarself met 
die advokaat 
Onwards onwards in Parow North 
Ben down the road is angry 
his ex-wife is roaming the streets 
there‟s no sign of his E-type 
she took everything even 
the hosepipe 
and entertains herself with 
the advocate 
and entertains herself with 
the advocate 
Ek droom nou van die 
Volkskasteller 
ek is gebuig soos Uri Geller 
die Swembad is vol chloor 
maar die tuinjong is vermoor 
ek het my vinger nog op die sneller 
ek het my vinger nog op die sneller 
I now dream of the 
Volkskas teller 
I‟m bent like Uri Geller 
there‟s chlorine in the swimming pool water 
but the gardener has been slaughtered 
I‟ve still got my finger on the trigger 
I‟ve still got my finger on the trigger 
Ek is „n doos 
van Bellville-Oos 
ek weet ek is verslaaf aan drank 
ek is oortrokke by die bank 
my dogter is „n boerepunk 
maar dank God ek‟s ten 
minste blank 
I‟m a sleaze 
from Bellville East 
I know I‟m addicted to alcohol 
I‟m overdrawn at the bank 
my daughter is a punk 
but thank God at least 
I‟m white 
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Kombuis‟ lyrics reveal a further commonality between white alternative South 
Africans and world-weary Generation Xers – the use of irony in order to convey 
their disdain for the false sincerity of their parent generation. The use of irony as 
a tool of expression goes beyond stylistic considerations, as irony, especially 
good irony, has the tendency to become self-reflexive, or: self-irony. This self-
reflexivity is sign of a more general self-centeredness, perhaps even selfishness, 
which is commonly ascribed to Generation Xers. In the case of the voëlvry 
movement it reveals itself in its failure to move beyond the concerns of “us” 
(Afrikaners) towards those of the “others”: 
But its [Voëlvry‟s] success also imposed a limitation. It never 
penetrated the working class, and stayed clear of the townships – 
physically, as well as in terms of most of its lyrical content. The 
problem with apartheid was what it was doing to “us” – “alternative” 
(but middle-class) Afrikaners. The symbols and institutions of 
Afrikaner nationalism became objects of irony. Afrikaner nationalism 
was turned on its head, and in elite circles it became fashionable to be 
an “alternative” Afrikaner. In a sense, the Voëlvry movement 
provided for an ethnic project without the ethnic politics. Yet the 
foundation of this was a critique of what apartheid did to the “self”, 
not the “other”; this was present in the lyrics of the movement, but 
somewhat marginal. (Grundlingh 2004) 
 
The rebellion against Afrikaner traditionalism and conservatism provided a 
sense of direction for young Afrikaners, but this sense seems to have become 
lost after the coming into power of those who had struggled against the same 
enemy all along. One would expect that the country‟s throwing off the shackles 
of its restrictive and racist regime would have provided young Afrikaners, and 
white South Africans in general, with new hope and space to breathe, but the 
overriding feeling for many seems to have been one of confusion and anxiety. 
Indeed, the voëlvry movement was practically over in the moment Nelson 
Mandela was freed from prison, and most of its members failed or struggled to 
build on their previous successes. 
 
It is in this moment of confusion where the commonalities between the different 
branches of white South African youth as well as Generation X are most 
evident, the uniting bond being the loss of the certainties of the past. This feeling 
is described in the semi-biographical novel Sunnyside Sal by Anton Krueger 
(2010) about the author and his friend Sal‟s Kerouakesque coming-to-age during 
the transitional years, as the protagonist describes his drug-fuelled confusion at 
the night of Nelson Mandela‟s inauguration as the first democratically elected 
president of South Africa: 
I realised that night that who we think we are is only an amalgamation 
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of the systems we know, that though the signs might be arbitrary, and 
although there‟s no intrinsic reason why green means go and red 
means stay, if you fail to recognise the context of a set of symbols 
then you don‟t have a self, then you‟re lost, then you‟re crazy. As we 
went over that day from the nationalist regime into a democracy, in 
those few hours, when everything changed, there was a brief gap in 
time when the old signs had not yet completely fallen away and the 
new ones had not yet been born. There was a liminal moment when 
the threshold was crossed, and it felt to me as though I‟d experienced 
the weightlessness of that transition, and had become momentarily 
trapped in the no-man‟s-land between meanings. I had experienced a 
moment without identity, without a framework. All I had to hold on to 
in that whirlpool of meaningless motion was the comfort of that 
immense symbol represented by Mandela. Without having had him to 
refer to, perhaps many more might have lost their minds in the going 
over. Perhaps I would still have been stuck in that terrifying place. 
(Krueger 2010: 72) 
 
 
Cultures of consumerism in the new South 
Africa 
 
Even though the political transition never resulted in the gloomy expectations of 
many white South Africans, it certainly meant a major change in the social and 
economic realities of most South Africans. Most importantly, the removal of 
racial discrimination (and the introduction of pro-black affirmative action) 
resulted in the accelerated growth of the black middle class. The abolition of 
segregation meant that formerly white schools were opened to black students 
and formerly white neighbourhoods were opened to black families. Black 
students soon comprised a majority of the student body at most universities. The 
racial profile of the senior ranks of the public sector was transformed rapidly, 
and of the private sector more slowly but still significantly. 
 
But change was not just a matter of policies, spatial desegregation and 
institutional reconfiguration, as it was also visible (and audible) in the cultural 
landscape, and one of the most vibrant signs of South Africa‟s imminent 
transformation was kwaito. Commonly understood as the sound that 
accompanied South Africa‟s discovery of a national discourse which went 
beyond the trenches of apartheid logic, kwaito embodies the antithesis to the 
heavily politicised atmosphere of the apartheid years, in that it meant the 
celebration of freedom and hedonism, and the reinterpretation of the urban 
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peripheries, the townships, as sites of cultural innovation and „coolness‟. As 
such it is usually, and sometimes negatively, stylized as the triumph of 
commercialism and materialism over ideology among the first generation of 
young black South Africans who experienced their formative years without 
having to fight against the oppressive laws of the previous regime. But despite 
kwaito‟s focus on fun and having a good time a (relatively small) number of 
kwaito songs deal with the legacy of apartheid in terms of racism (e.g. Kaffir by 
Arthur Mafokate) or the challenges of growing up in the townships (e.g. 
Mdlewembe by Zola). In the same vein it would be misleading to automatically 
dismiss kwaito as music without meaning because of its general focus on beats 
instead of lyrics (Peterson 2003; Mhlambi 2004), or to locate it merely in the 
post-apartheid period without making references to its roots in marabi dance, 
mbaqanga and bubblegum music (Boloka 2003). While it is necessary to 
acknowledge the complexity of kwaito, and in the lives of black urban youth 
during the 1990s in general, it is undeniable that this post-apartheid generation 
were more prone to consumerism than their parent generations, especially from 
the late 1990s onwards. Part of this development was an opening-up to foreign, 
especially US or Western, influences, which are evident in the music (house and 
hip hop
3
), fashion (US American streetwear) and language (US hip hop lingo), 
making it at once a truly cosmopolitan and distinctively South African 
phenomenon. Another sign for the paradigm shift in the cultural, especially 
musical, sector that occurred during the 1990s was a process of intensifying 
commodification and commercialisation, exemplified by the way in which one 
of the first kwaito groups, Boom Shaka, was assembled by music producer Don 
Laka in 1993 in a similar fashion as British and American boy groups at the 
time. Another example is the emergence and growing success of Gauteng radio 
station YFM and associated youth magazine YMag which captured the spirit of 
kwaito and gave it a name – Y Culture. Young South Africans‟ insouciance at 
                                                 
3 Side Comment: Hip hop in South Africa. Following the example of US American hip hop, 
South African hip hop started at the fringes of society and urbanity in the early 1980s where 
black youth were looking for a way to vent their anger and frustration with being 
disadvantaged in an unfair and unequal society. Blackness, however, was the racial identity 
chosen by those early rappers in the Cape Flats; according to apartheid‟s crude categorisation 
they were considered coloured - the “race of miscegenation”. Hip Hop provided members of 
bands such as Prophets of Da City and Black Noise to distance themselves from a perceived 
illicit partnership between the coloured population and the white regime and to align 
themselves with the Black Consciousness Movement. The 1990s saw the expansion of 
popular kwaito artists such as Zola and Bongo Muffin into hip hop territory and today 
genuine hip hop crews such as ProKid and Driemanskap are successfully rapping in the 
African vernacular in order to reach a large and growing audience of fans who appreciate the 
depth, sincerity and relevance of much local hip hop. But the currently most successful South 
African hip hop outfit in terms of international success (thanks to YouTube) is the Afrikaans 
group Die Antwoord with its self-ironic use of a white trash imagery and slang. 
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embracing the non-values of consumerism and materialism has been poignantly 
noted by Gavin Steingo (2005: 351) writing about the inversion from gold as a 
symbol of apartheid oppression to a status symbol: 
In the cover sleeve of Mandoza‟s album Godoba, the artist wears 
clothes resembling those of a „„typical‟‟ hip-hop artist, and he wears a 
thick gold chain. The picture of Mandoza, in almost every way, 
resembles American and Cape hip-hop artists and gangster rappers. 
But there is something unusual here, something not typical of those 
artists: Mandoza is smiling. This is the punctum. For the kwaito artist 
– and here for Mandoza – wearing a huge gold chain is not an act of 
subversion; or, rather, it is a double subversion. Mandoza subverts 
what was previously an act of subversion. What was previously a 
„„refusal by overacceptance‟‟ is now merely „„acceptance.‟‟ However, 
Mandoza does not change the signs themselves; rather, he attributes 
new meaning to those signs – he subverts the meaning of signs that 
previously signified subversion. So, at once, Mandoza „„naturalizes‟‟ 
the signs – he negates the subversion – and he subverts the meaning of 
subversive signs and, by acting out a double negative, embraces the 
capitalist „„ethos of consumption.‟‟ He accepts. 
 
Mandoza‟s acceptance, even embrace, of capitalist consumerism (as seen by 
Steingo) turns the old (anti-)apartheid logic upside down; while anti-apartheid 
protesters fighting against the oppressive and racist regime were usually tainted 
as communist revolutionists by the government, young South Africans are 
celebrating their hard-won freedom with the same symbols (minus the racist 
ideology) of the old enemy. A more positive reading of the consumerist 
inclination of South African black youth is presented by Bhekizizwe Peterson 
(2003: 210) 
For one, the preoccupation with consumption can be interpreted as an 
acceptance of the larger societal ethos that informs many South 
Africans of different backgrounds and ages. Alternatively, even in its 
most nihilistic forms, the celebration of consumption in black youth 
may attest to their courage and commitment not to give in to the 
conditions of poverty and strife found in the townships. The success of 
many artists, actors and soccer stars affords them a measure of upward 
social mobility, a change in class and status that many find difficult to 
negotiate. The result is a difficult juggling act between, on the one 
hand, an exaggerated need to re-affirm one‟s continued affiliation to 
the townships, with the ghetto being reduced to the ability to „hang 
rough and tough‟. On the other hand, there is a compulsion to leave no 
doubt that with regard to material success, one has left the ghetto and 
its „botheration‟. 
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Materialism and aspiration are not confined to the „ghetto‟, however, as the 
children of the new black middle class also embraced a new, post-apartheid 
culture of consumption defined by suburban imagery and comforts. This is 
described evocatively in the novel Coconut, by Kopano Matlwa – herself a 
young university student when she wrote the novel. One of the central characters 
in the novel is Ofilwe, who was born in a township but now lives in the security-
protected „Little Valley Country Estate‟. Ofilwe and her brother are „Model C 
children‟, referring to the fact that they attend formerly white schools. Ofilwe 
herself speaks English at home – the „TV language‟, „the one that spoke of 
sweet success‟ (Matlwa 2007: 54). Her family embraces westernisation and 
distance themselves from African „tradition‟: They attend an Anglican church, 
prefer westernized names over African ones, and every Sunday go to the Silver 
Spoon Coffee Shop (in the Little Square Shopping Centre) to eat Traditional 
English Breakfasts. In one scene, Matlwa describes Ofilwe musing about how 
different her life would be if she still lived in a township: 
Instead of waking up to my cubed fruit, muesli and mixed nuts on a 
bed of low-fat granadilla yoghurt, would I begin my day by polishing 
the red stoep that juts out at the front of Koko‟s two-roomed house? 
When bored, would I pass the time by naming stones and creating 
homes for them in the wet dirt that surrounds Koko‟s self-made 
outside toilet instead of playing Solitaire on Mama‟s laptop, as I do 
now? Would I steal handfuls of sugar from the former mielie-meal 
bucket under the sink and run to lie on the grass to let the sweet 
crystals melt on my tongue instead of forgetting to give Daddy back 
his change, forget it was not mine for the keeping and forget I was not 
supposed to use it to buy honey and almond nougat bars from the 
health shop outside the estate gates. Instead of a decaf Café Latte at 
Bedazzle on Thursday nights would I freeze my Cool-Ad and save it 
for a really hot day? Would it matter who my clothes were named 
after? Would I got into respiratory distress at the thought of wearing 
garments with no names at all? (Matlwa 2007: 13-14) 
 
Ofilwe‟s world – as described by Matlwa – is one that has also been documented 
by sociologists. Nadine Dolby and Lucert Nkuna provide rich ethnographic 
accounts of the importance of fashion as a marker of status among adolescents 
in Durban and Johannesburg respectively. Dolby‟s (2001) study focuses on a 
school in a formerly „white‟ neighbourhood which, after apartheid, was attended 
by black, coloured, Indian and white students. The pupils were united by their 
commitment to a consumerist culture, although different groups of students – 
broadly but not exactly corresponding to racial groups – had different 
preferences with regard to the details and brands of clothing, shoes and music. 
Corresponding observations were made by Nkuna (2006) who examined the 
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similarly „mixed‟ population of adolescents in a Johannesburg mall. 
 
 
Poverty and the limits to consumerism 
 
The consumerist suburban world described by Matlwa exerts a powerful appeal 
to young men and women from much poorer backgrounds, even if they have 
little chance of achieving their aspirations of upward mobility. The second 
central character in Matlwa‟s novel Coconut is Fikile, who lives in a shack in a 
very poor neighbourhood; they have no bathroom, and only an outside toilet. 
But she works in the Silver Spoon Coffee Shop, and aspires to the lifestyle of 
the shop‟s rich customers, including Ofilwe. In Matlwa‟s account, Fikile is 
hostile to other people who are as poor as her, reflecting her desperation to be 
different and to escape from poverty herself. To get to work, Mpatlwa writes, 
Fikile takes a train and then two taxi rides. She disparages the other passengers 
on the train and taxis:  
Sometimes one wants to be alone with one‟s thoughts and not have to 
deal with bad breath and body odour so early in the morning. Women 
are not so bad. They bore me with their questions about how I manage 
to keep my figure so slim or the stories about their harsh white bosses 
at work or the long tales of their various illnesses, aches and pains, but 
I still prefer them to the men. The men still disgust me. All of them 
are a bunch of criminals. A bunch of uneducated criminals. They look 
at me like they want to rape me and I know they would do it if there 
weren‟t so many people around. They call me Nice and Nana and 
whisper other crude things as I walk past them hanging against the 
wall, unclean and smelling of alcohol. I hate them and they know it. 
They have no respect for women, so why should I have any respect for 
them? I do not respond to them, even to the ones who greet me 
politely. I keep my chin up and walk straight past them as if I cannot 
hear them. Maybe there are some good ones who really mean no harm 
but unfortunately their peers have sullied their name. In fact, as a 
general rule I try not to mix with any black men at all. It just makes 
things easier. (Matlwa 2007: 129-30) 
 
Her journey to work is completed with a walk from the taxi stop to the coffee 
shop. She ignores any other people she passes. 
I am not one of you, I want to tell them. Some day you will see me 
drive past here in a sleek air-conditioned car, and I will roll up my 
windows if you try to come near me, because I am not one of you. 
You are poor and black and I am rich and brown. (Matlwa 2007: 140). 
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Survey research reveals clearly that most adolescent boys and girls, at least in 
urban areas, have aspirations like Fikile‟s; the end of apartheid means that 
young people like Fikile have some chance of achieving their aspirations, but 
the chances are slim. Fikile has the advantage of having a job – in an economy 
where unemployment rates among young people are among the highest in the 
world. In September 2007, for example, the official Labour Force Survey found 
that the unemployment rate (using the broad definition favoured by everyone but 
the government) was 74% among 15-19 year-olds, 60% among 20-24 year-olds 
and 43% among 25-29 year-olds. In South Africa as a whole, chronic 
unemployment is the normal experience of most young men and women. 
Education is the primary route out of poverty, but poor adolescents face huge 
obstacles in completing secondary school. Adolescents in poor neighbourhoods 
often grow up in homes and streets where physical violence is commonplace, 
and emotional abuse even more so. Home environments are often unstable, and 
parents are rarely able to provide the concrete forms of assistance that children 
need to perform well in school. Schools themselves are often appalling. 
Ramphele describes the high school in the area of Cape Town where she 
conducted research as „a caricature of what an educational institution ought to 
be‟ (Ramphele 2002: 92). The administration was poor, the teachers 
demoralized, the premises unkempt (see Bray et al 2010: chapter 5). Faced with 
this, ambitious children (and their parents) aspire to escape to better schools, 
especially formerly white schools in formerly white neighbourhoods. This, 
however, can provoke ostracism from neighbours, for „playing white‟ 
(Ramphele 2002). For many young men and women in post-apartheid South 
Africa, the transition to adulthood entails the slow recognition that you are not 
going to achieve your aspirations and will remain poor. 
 
Similarly, the focus on consumerism and “Westernisation” in much post-
apartheid literature on South African youth tends to distract from the inequality 
of access to Western popular culture due to socio-economic and cultural (i.e. 
language) differences. For example: in 1995 36 percent of black participants in 
the All Media and Product Survey (AMPS) had watched TV the previous day 
(51 percent within the previous week) compared to 79 (91) percent of coloured 
and 84 (96) percent of white participants. Moreover, only six percent of black 
respondents had watched the English/Afrikaans channel TV1, but 35 percent 
(almost all of black respondents who had switched on the TV that day) had 
watched the African-language (including Afrikaans) channel CCV. In 
comparison, 70 percent of white viewers had tuned into TV1, and 23 percent 
into CCV. The greatest disparity, however, applies to the subscription-based 
satellite service MNet which provides access to the latest US American and 
British movies and TV series: less than one percent of black participants had 
watched it the previous day, while 37 percent of white had done so. Similar 
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patterns apply to radio and print media consumption (SAARF 1995; see also 
Strelitz 2005; Schenk 2009). 
 
The obstacles of poverty for many South African youth and the perceived and 
real effects of affirmative action on young people‟s opportunities on the labour 
market are to a large part responsible for a strong diversity of expectations and 
hopes (or lack thereof) for the future among young South Africans. In 
combination with the unequal access to global media (in more recent years 
accentuated by a distinct digital divide) this translates into different ways in 
which young South Africans make use of foreign influences in order to define 
themselves and others. Extraordinarily, young people in poor and very poor 
African neighbourhoods in Cape Town retain an optimistic outlook, and a sense 
of self-efficacy, into their early 20s at least. Although these kids are very 
knowledgeable about the latest American and European music trends, especially 
with regards to RnB and hip hop, they tend to idolise South African house, 
kwaito and, more recently, hip hop celebrities. In contrast, young men and 
women in working-class coloured neighbourhoods in Cape Town are generally 
pessimistic and defiant about their opportunities in the new South Africa. 
Accordingly, they often tend to identify with the imagery, style and behaviour of 
American gangster rappers or RnB artists (Hammett 2009), sometimes to the 
point that they become active members in one of Cape Town‟s notorious gangs 
which borrow heavily from their North-American counterparts in terms of music 
and fashion (Salo 2004; Jensen 2008). Young white South Africans are often 
adamant in reaffirming their “Africaness” at least in geographical terms, but at 
the same time express their discomfort with the current political situation by 
referring to their “European roots” which is reflected in a distinct taste for South 
African or foreign rock music, including punk and emo, or certain foreign pop 
and hip hop idols, such as Madonna or Eminem (Basson 2007). 
 
 
The Invisibility of Race in Generation X 
 
What distinguishes this outline of South Africa‟s youth during the transition 
from apartheid to democracy from most accounts of Generation X in the North 
American context is its heavy focus on race. On the one hand this seems to be 
self-explanatory; a long history of informal and formal racial segregation have 
left the country deeply divided in spatial, economical, cultural and attitudinal 
terms along racial lines, and any discussion of South African society needs to 
take these differences into account, even though some of the redistributional 
policies since the end of apartheid (and even some from before) have shifted the 
significance of racial differences somewhat to a more class-based stratification 
of South African society (Seekings & Nattrass 2005). 
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On the other hand, the silence on racial as well as class distinctions in 
descriptions of America‟s Generation X is astonishing given the social 
stratification in North America. This is not to say that Generation X itself is not 
diverse; in fact many commentators have emphasised the ethnic diversity of 
America‟s Generation X. But the pure acknowledgement, or celebration, of 
diversity cannot distract from the lack of engagement with its political and social 
implications, as Ortner (1998: 421) points out
4
: 
They have a somewhat congratulatory tone, as if being 
demographically more diverse were some sort of (white) achievement, 
or as if it guaranteed a growth of tolerance, which may or may not be 
the case – no evidence is presented. In any event, despite these 
indications of greater diversity, the actual Generation X public culture 
– the journalism, the novels, the films – is almost entirely white. 
And despite the vast influence and popularity of African American 
performers in popular music, most of the musicians and groups taken 
as epitomizing Generation X (such as Nirvana, Beck, Hole, and 
Offspring) are white. (...) 
Or as rapper Dr. Dre put it, “I haven't heard anyone in my „hood 
talking about [GenerationX]... The only X I know is Malcolm X” 
(quoted in Giles 1994: 64). 
My point is not so much that the Generation X representation 
“excludes” blacks, as if Generation X were some club to which 
African Americans or other minorities would like admission. Rather, 
it is that the racialization of the representation, white-not-racially-
marked, hides more significant class divisions at work. In my own 
ethnographic data, young African Americans in their twenties who 
were stuck in prime Gen X locations (I will get to what those are in a 
moment) sounded virtually indistinguishable from young white 
twenty-somethings in the same situation; it is the locations that are 
                                                 
4  The idea of Generation X as primarily white phenomenon is shared by Bakari Kitwana, 
former Executive Editor of the most influential magazine on black American youth culture, 
The Source, as he writes about the need to establish the idea of a Hip Hop Generation 
alongside Generation X: 
 During the mid-1990s, as head editor of The Source: the magazine of hip-hop music 
culture and politics, I began to use the term “the hip-hop generation” to define our generation. 
Around that time, the label Generation X began to be loosely applied to young twenty-
somethings, white and Black alike. Just as Black baby boomers were mostly defined by the 
civil rights and Black power movements, Black twenty-somethings were more than just 
Generation Xers in Black face. At the same time, the term “hip-hop nation” was en vogue. 
Hip-hop kids did not represent a nation any more than they were carbon copies of white 
Generation Xers. In response, those of us at The Source began to use the phrase “the hip-hop 
generation” to refer to our specific generation. It was our attempt to bring critical focus to the 
issues that defined our time and that went beyond simply rap music. (Kitwana 2002: xiii: ) 
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obscured by the racialization of the categories. 
 
Ortner makes an intriguing point by singling out class as the actual identifier of 
Generation X. Race per se is not necessarily what defines Generation X, she 
maintains, but ignoring the racialisation of class representations – in Generation 
X‟s case white middle-class – obscures the true character of Generation X and 
its location in the public consciousness. She also states in her article that “(…) 
the question is one of locating it correctly rather than denying its existence.” 
(Ortner 1998: 420). 
 
In this light the prevalence of Generation X as an all-encompassing label 
appears remarkable. Perhaps it is the transparency of whiteness, its assumed 
neutrality, which allows its cultural expressions to pass as mainstream, despite 
the increasing dominance of black American popular culture in large parts of 
Western society. To some extent this racial bias in the representation of 
Generation X is also detectable in the South African context; while studies on 
local manifestations of global images of whiteness are still rare and rather recent 
(Steyn 2001; Ballantine 2004; Baines 2008), the influence of black American 
popular culture, especially hip hop, on black South African youth has long been 
the object of public and scholarly scrutiny. While one part of the debate has 
focussed on the apparent negative aspects (reminiscent of the „lost generation‟ 
panic), a number of commentators have emphasised the self-sufficiency and 
uniqueness of post-apartheid black South African popular culture despite the 
acknowledged influences of a certain „ghetto‟, „hustler‟, „gangster‟ or „bling-
bling‟ trope in its make-up (Peterson 2003; Salo 2004; Haupt 2008). 
 
Generation X‟s interplay between representations of whiteness and middle-class 
has significant implications for locating Generation X in South Africa as there 
are only two groups which fulfil the middle-class requirement in order to pass as 
Generation X: unhappy white youth at the end of apartheid exemplified by the 
voëlvry movement and the emergent black middle-class after the end of 
apartheid represented by Ofilwe. But both cases do not fit easily for different 
reasons; while the voëlvry protagonists resemble Generation Xers in their search 
for a way out of suburbia, they did not share their nihilism and were instead 
highly politicised and anti-consumerist. The black middle-class of the new 
South Africa, on the other hand, is generally portrayed very differently as 
apolitical and materialistic. Yet it possesses a certain ambiguity towards the 
symbols of middle-class which is perfectly depicted in Ofilwe‟s insecurity about 
her status and position in society as she feels trapped between what she sees as 
white and black ways of doing things. The whiteness of middle-class, hidden in 
Generation X, then reveals itself in the title of Matlwa‟s book: in South Africa a 
Coconut is a rather offending word for someone who is seen as black on the 
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